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COMMENTS
THE EFFECT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT ON
ARRESTS WITHOUT A WARRANT
Under recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court,
if an arrest made by either state or federal law enforcement
officers does not meet the fourth amendment's requirements of
"reasonableness" and "probable cause,"' evidence obtained as
a result of that arrest will be inadmissible in a state or federal
criminal prosecution.
The Court established in Mapp v. Ohio2 that tangible results
of an unconstitutional search are inadmissible in state courts.
Mapp also stated that the exclusionary rule established in Weeks
v. United States3 and Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States4
prohibiting the use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence in
federal courts is a constitutional requirement, and not merely
a rule developed by the Supreme Court under its supervisory
powers.5 The decision in Ker v. California6 elaborated on Mapp
and clearly announced that the fourth amendment, and with
it the exclusionary rule, is binding on the states.
Since Mapp made the protection of the fourth amendment ef-
fective against the states and prohibited the admission in state
courts of tangible evidence obtained by an unconstitutional
search, the next logical step was the exclusion in state prose-
cutions of tangible evidence obtained by unconstitutional arrest,
1. U.S. CONST. amend IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but on probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized."
2. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
4. 251 U.S. 385 (1920). In that case the Court held that evidence obtained
in violation of the fourth amendment not only cannot be admitted in evidence,
but also cannot be used for any other purpose. Thus the fourth amendment pro-
hibited the admission of evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search and
seizure and also any other information or evidence obtained as a result of the
improperly seized evidence.
5. 367 U.S. 643, 649 (1962) : "There are in the cases of this Court some
passing reference to the Weeks rule as being one of evidence. But the plain
and unequivocal language of Weeks-and its later paraphrase in Wolf-to the
effect that the Weeks rule is of constitutional origin, remains entirely undisturbed."
6. 367 U.S. 23 (1962).
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since the fourth amendment protects against unreasonable ar-
rests as well as unreasonable searches. 7 This step was taken in
Beck v. Ohio.8 In that case the Supreme Court held that since
the municipal police officers did not have sufficient informa-
tion to constitute "probable cause" for Beck's arrest at the time
it was made,9 the arrest was invalid under the fourth and four-
teenth amendments. Clearing house slips later found on his
person were therefore inadmissible as evidence in the Ohio
court. For analytical purposes a distinction should be noted
between cases in which evidence is held inadmissible because
it was obtained through an unconstitutional search which re-
sulted in the arrest of the defendant and cases in which an un-
constitutional arrest was accompanied by a search incidental
to the arrest, which revealed incriminating evidence. In the
former .the problem is the validity of the search; in the latter
it is the legality of the arrest. If the arrest is valid, the search
incidental to the arrest is also valid, assuming that the scope
of the search is within the limits allowed for a search incident
to arrest.10 Mapp v. Ohio is an example of the first type of
case, and Beck v. Ohio illustrates the second. This Comment
deals with the second type, in which the validity of the arrest
determines the validity of the search and the admissibility of the
evidence obtained.
The holdings of Mapp, Ker, and Beck directly establish that
any tangible evidence obtained through an unconstitutional ar-
rest is inadmissible. Wong Sun v. United States" seems to sug-
gest that any intangible evidence obtained in this manner will
7. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959) ; Giordenello v. United States,
357 U.S. 480 (1958); Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1 (1927). See also
Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, and The Fourth Amendment, 1960
SUP. CT. RzV. 46.
8. 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
9. It is axiomatic that an arrest is not justified by what a subsequent search
discloses. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959) ; United Sta.tes v. DiRe,
332 U.S. 581 (1948); United States v. Como, 340 F.2d 891 (7th Cir. 1965)
Pigg v. United States, 337 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1964).
10. A consideration of the ambit of a search incidental to a lawful arrest is
beyond the scope of this paper. But see Preston v. United otates, 376 U.S. 364
(1964) and United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) for a discussion of
this problem. Justice Frankfurter gave a succinct statement of the justification
for the search incidental to an arrest in Rabinowitz. The purposes of the search
are "to protect the arresting officer[,] . . . to deprive the prisoner of potential
means of escape . . . and . . . to avoid destruction of evidence by the arrested
person." These basic reasons have been restated in many other cases. See, e.g.,
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) and Preston v. United States, 376
U.S. 364 (1964).
11. 371 U.S. 471 (1963). See also note 14 infra.
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also be excluded. 12 In Wong Sun federal narcotics agents ar-
rested petitioner, James Wah Toy, on grounds which did not
meet the fourth amendment's requirement of probable cause.
Immediately after his arrest, Toy voluntarily made incriminat-
ing statements which were used as evidence against him in a
prosecution for violation of federal narcotics laws. The Supreme
Court held that since Toy's arrest violated his fourth amend-
ment rights, the evidence obtained as a result of that arrest-
the incriminating statements - must be excluded. The perti-
nent language is:
"The exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from
trial physical, tangible materials obtained during or as a
direct result of an unlawful invasion. It follows from . . .
Silverman v. United States'3 . . . that the fourth amend-
ment may protect against the overhearing of verbal state-
ments as well as against the more traditional seizure of
'papers and effects'.
"Nor do the policies underlying the exclusionary rule in-
vite any logical distinction between physical and verbal evi-
dence."
Although Wong Sun involved action by federal agents and
prosecution in a federal court, the decision is based on the fourth
amendment, and it seems to follow from Mapp and Ker that the
standard utilized to determine fourth amendment violations is
the same whether appplied to federal or state officers. 1 4 It is
12. Mapp stated that the exclusionary rule of Weeks is a constitutional doc-
trine (see note 5 supra), and Silverthorne stated that Weeks is meaningless
unless all evidence resulting from.a fourth amendment violation is inadmissible,
rather than excluding only direct results of an unconstitutional search or seizure.
Thus it would seem that Silverthorne, as well as Weeks, states a constitutional
rule of the fourth amendment, rather than a rule enunciated by the Supreme
Court in its supervisory powers, and is hence obligatory upon the states. Further-
more, if Wong Sun applies to the states, it is submitted that any evidence dis-
covered as a result of oral statements made following an unconstitutional arrest
is inadmissible in a state prosecution.
13. 365 U.S. 505 (1961). In that case a unanimous Court held that eaves-
dropping by law enforcement officers using an electronic listening device which
was inserted into a party wall constituted a violation of the petitioners' fourth
amendment rights and that conversations thus overheard were therefore inad-
missible.
14. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1962) : "We hold that all evidence obtained by searches
and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmis-
sible in a state court.
"Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable
against the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is en-
forceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the
Federal Government." (Emphasis added.)
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therefore suggested that the holding of Wong Sun would have
been the same had the petitioner been arrested by state law
enforcement officers and prosecuted in a state court.15
If an unconstitutional arrest results in the exclusion of any
evidence obtained as a consequence of the arrest, it is apparent
that law enforcement officers must ascertain the exact stand-:
ards for determining the validity of an arrest. There are nu-
merous decisions 6 holding that in the absence of ipplicable fed-
eral statutory law, state law determines the validity of an arrest,
even if it is made by federal officers. It must be remembered,
however, that the state rules concerning arrests must fulfill the
basic requirements of the fourth amendment. The United States
Supreme Court decisions dealing with the validity of arrests17
establish probable cause as the irimary requirement of the
fourth amendment, with little emphasis being given to the fourth
amendment's requirement of "reasonableness." It seems that
an arrest meets the "reasonableness" requirement only if there is
"probable cause" for the arrest at the time it is made. 18
15. See Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interrogation,
25 OHIo ST. L.J. 449, 459 (1964), suggesting that Wong Sun definitely applies
to the states, since the Court remanded Traub v. Connecticut, 374 U.S. 493
(1963), for reconsideration in light of Wong Sun after the state court had held
admissible a confession obtained after an unconstitutional arrest.
At present, Wong Sun represents the furthest limits of fourth amendment
protection. It seems logical to suggest, however, that the am-bit of the fourth
amendment could he expanded to cover the situation in which there is an un-
constitutional arrest and nothing more. One of the reasons for applying the
exclusionary rule to the states through the fourth amendment is that the rule
of exclusion is necessary to enforce the rights guaranteed by the fourth amend2
ment, and there must be an effective protection for a right if the right is to be
meaningful. If this reasoning is carried to its logical extremes, it could be argued
that a person who is merely unlawfully arrested, with no accompanying search,
questioning, or anything else, cannot be prosecuted at that time (at least for the
crime for which he was arrested), since the fourth amendment clearly protects
"the right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable
• . . seizures." (Emphasis added.), and the only really effective method of pre-
venting unlawful arrests is by granting the subject of such an arrest immunity
from prosecution. So far, however, the Court has refused to recognize such an
immunity. For example, in Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952), the defendant
was kidnapped in another state in order to bring him irnto the jurisdiction of the
state court in which he was subsequently tried and convicted. The United States
Supreme Court held that this did not deprive the state court of its criminal
jurisdiction.
16. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958) ; Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10 (1948); United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581 (1948); Ralph v.
L'epersack, 335 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1964) ; United States v. Burgos, 269 F.2d 763
(4th Cir. 1959).
17. See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) ; Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963) ; Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959) ; Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1947).
18. For instance, in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1962),
the United States Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals' finding that
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Since the issue of probable cause is crucial in determining
whether an arrest fulfills the requirements of the fourth amend-
ment, an attempt should be made to specify the factors to be
considered in deciding whether there is probable cause for an
arrest. Although the validity of prosecutions in state courts
based on arrests made by state officers has been a fourth amend-
ment problem only since the Mapp decision, the Supreme Court
had previously dealt with numerous cases involving arrests by
federal officers,' 9 and since the fourth amendment requirements
concerning arrests are now the same for both state and federal
officers, the pre-Mapp federal cases dealing with probable cause
for an arrest are pertinent in determining when a state officer
may make an arrest.
The Supreme Court has often stated 20 that probable cause
exists only "if the facts and circumstances known to the officer
warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has been
committed." The question to be considered is whether "prudent
men in the shoes of [the] officers would [have enough informa-
tion] to permit them to believe that petitioner was violating or
had violated the law."'" The Court has noted that, "in dealing
with probable cause . .. we are dealing with probabilities.
[These probabilities] are the factual and practical considerations
of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act."'2 2 For this reason, the court has repeatedly
held that probable cause for arrest may be established by facts
which would be inadmissible as evidence in determining the
"there was neither reasonable grounds nor probable cause for Toy's arrest." Mr.
Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority of the Court, then spent six pages
discussing the reasons for the finding that there was no probable cause. No
further mention was made of the lack of "reasonable grounds."
Most statutes giving officers -the authority to make arrests without a warrant
condition the validity of the arrest on the existence of "reasonable cause." E.g.,
LA. R.S. 15:60 (1954) ; 18 U.S.C. § 3052 (1958). However, the meaning of
reasonable cause as used in these statutes has been equated with the "probable
cause" of the fourth amendment. See Wong Sun v. United States, supra. For a
detailed discussion of the distinction between probable cause and reasonableness,
see Comment, 26 LA. L. REv. 802 (1966).
19. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1962); Henry v.
United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959) ; Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307
(1959) ; Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
20. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959) ; Giordenello v. United
States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1957) ; United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581, 592
(1948) ; Director General v. Katsenbaum, 263 U.S. 25, 28 (1923) ; Stacey v.
Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878). Of course, after probable cause to believe that
an offense has been committed is established, there must also be probable cause
to believe that a particular suspect committed it.




guilt of the defendant.23  In Carroll v. United States24 the court
enunciated the basis for all subsequent definitions of probable
cause: "reasonable ground for belief of guilt." In Brinegar, Mr.
Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority of the court, deter-
mined the problem as one of defining the shadowy line between
mere suspicion and probable cause; "that line must be drawn
by an act of judgment formed in the light of the particular sit-
uation and with account taken.of all the eircumstances. ' 25
An examination of Supreme Court decisions concerning the
existence of probable cause reveals that the court's usual tech-
nique is to quote some of the general statements about the
nature of probable cause and then, after examining the specific
facts of the case, to decide whether probable cause existed for
that particular arrest. This method of resolving the issue is no
doubt occasioned in part by the very nature of probable cause:
it depends on all the surrounding circumstances, and is there-
fore unique in every case. However, it is for this reason diffi-
cult to outline the factors which must be considered by law en-
forcement officers and to determine the quantum of evidence
they must possess in order to have probable cause for an arrest.
The fact that presently there are no specific guidelines is un-
fortunate because the questions of what information is to be
considered and how much relevant information is necessary are
faced by law enforcement officers each time they consider mak-
ing an arrest. It seems logical that something akin to a mathe-
matical probability based on (1) the degree of certainty that a
crime has in fact been committed, and (2) the degree of cer-
tainty that the particular suspect committed the crime if a
23. In Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), hearsay was used to
establish probable cause. In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1948),
the fact that the officer had previously arrested petitioner for the same type of
offense was considered pertinent to the existence of probable cause, although the
previous arrest was inadmissible as evidence of petitioner's guilt.
24. 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1924).
25. 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1948). Most of the cases do not draw a distinction
between probable cause for an arrest and probable cause for a search. However,
it was stated in Miller v. Sigler, 343 F.2d 424, 427 (8th Cir. 1965) that "probable
cause to search is 'much less' than probable cause to arrest." Although standards
set in cases involving probable cause for an arrest are used to determine whether
there is probable cause for a search in a later case, and vice versa, it is submitted
that a distinction between the two types of probable cause should be formulated,
since the rights protected by the fourth amendment are essentially rights of privacy
and personal dignity. A person's right of privacy seems to be more severely in-
vaded when he is arrested and taken to a police station for questioning than when
his house or automobile is searched. It is therefore suggested that the require-
ments for probable cause for arrest should be more stringent than those for
prnl-1,1e cause for a search.
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crime has been committed, would be considered in determining
the existence of probable cause in a given situation. Probable
cause requires that it be very likely that a crime has been com-
mitted and that the suspect has committed it. Even though there
is almost entire certainty that a crime has been committed, if
there is a small degree of probability that the suspect committed
it, there is no probable cause for his arrest, and vice versa. How-
ever, when it is all but certain that a crime has been committed,
probable cause may be satisfied by a slightly lesser degree of
probability that the suspect committed it than otherwise.
In considering the standards announced by the Supreme
Court for finding probable cause, it must be remembered that
the Court apparently considers the amount of probable cause
necessary for an arrest to be a fixed entity regardless of the
type of crime. 26 The amount of information the police must pos-
sess in order to legally arrest a person for a crime seems to be
the same, whether the crime be rape or bigamy. In determining
the presence or absence of probable cause, it does not seem to
matter whether the person arrested is suspected of stealing an
automobile or of stealing an atomic bomb.27 The only member
of the Supreme Court who has ever suggested that the standard
of probable cause should vary with the seriousness of the crime
was Justice Jackson. Dissenting in Brinegar v. United States,28
he stated that the police should be allowed to search every car
in the area where a child has been kidnapped, but such a prac-
tice should not be allowed when the crime involved concerns
the illegal transportation of whisky. In McDonald v. United
States29 he again expressed the view that the gravity of the
26. There is dictum in State v. McIlvaine, 247 La. 747, 174 So. 2d 515 (1965),
which suggests that the Louisiana Supreme Court considers the nature of the
crime in determining whether an arrest is "reasonable." In that case the court
said: "[W]e think it is entirely probable that inferences and conclusions from
facts may be made in a narcotics case which may conceivably offend standards
of reasonableness in another case. The very nature of narcotics transactions ...
dictate that a different standard should apply." Id. at 750, 174 So. 2d at 521.
Justice McCaleb, in a dissenting opinion, argues against applying a less strict
standard of reasonableness to narcotics cases than to other types of crimes, saying:
"The constitution . . . extends its protection against unreasonable searches to
all and I find no basis in law for the formulation of special rules or relaxed
standards for determining reasonableness in testing the validity of arrest for par-
ticular crimes." Id. at 752, 174 So. 2d at 523.
27. For a feasible plan for stealing an atomic bomb, see FLEMING, THUNDER-
BALL (1961).
28. 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949).
29. 335 U.S. 451, 459 (1948) (concurring opinion). Although Brinegar and
McDonald dealt with probable cause for a search, Mr. Justice Jackson's reasoning
is applicable to probable cause for an arrest.
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offense should be considered in determining the legality of the
arrest. No majority opinion of the Court, however, has consid-
ered such factors as the nature of the crime, the risk of escape,
or the risk of further harm in determining whether probable
cause existed for an arrest. It is submitted, however, that since
probable cause depends on all the circumstances of a case,80 the
Court would consider the nature of the crime as one of the
circumstances, and if a case arose in which the exigencies were
such that an immediate arrest was imperative, it would probably
be held valid, even though the information possessed by the offi-
cers at the time would not constitute probable cause for arrest
for a lesser crime.
Although it is impossible to formulate a concise rule applica-
ble in any situation to ascertain the existence of probable cause
for arrest, a general idea of the type of information needed can
be discerned by examining the facts of various Supreme Court
cases.
The arrest in Henry v. United States5 ' was held illegal be-
cause the officers did not have probable cause at the time the
arrest was made. Officers were investigating a theft of whisky
when they saw Henry and a friend loading cartons into a car.
The officers had some vague information that one of the men
might be connected with "interstate shipments," but they had
no way of knowing what the cartons contained. The officers
arrested Henry and his friend, and it was later learned that the
cartons contained stolen radios. The Supreme Court held the
radios inadmissible as evidence in Henry's trial for unlawfully
possessing radios stolen from an interstate shipment, because
the arrest which resulted in the discovery of the radios was
unconstitutional.
Ker v. California&3 2 further elucidates the Court's concept of
probable cause.33 Officers of the Los Angeles Sheriff's Office
had observed Murphy, a known narcotics peddler, sell narcotics
at a particular place in Los Angeles. The following night they
saw Murphy and Ker go through the same procedure at the
30. See cases cited note 19 supra.
31. 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
32. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
33. It should be noted, however, that the opinion of Mr. Justice Clark was
joined by only three other Justices. The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan
and the dissent, written by Justice Brennan, were both based on grounds other
than the presence or absence of probable cause for the arrest.
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same location. Because of distance and darkness, however, the
officers did not actually see any narcotics change hands. When
Ker drove away the officers followed him, but Ker made a
U-turn and eluded them. The officers had also received informa-
tion that Ker was selling marijuana which he was "possibly
securing from . . .Murphy." The officers then went to Ker's
apartment, and in the parking lot they found the automobile
which they had been following. After discovering that some-
one was in Ker's apartment, the officers obtained a pass key,
entered the apartment unannounced,3 4 and found Ker, his wife,
and about two pounds of marijuana.
The Court reasoned that for the marijuana to be admissible
as evidence, it must be the product of a search incidental to
a lawful arrest, and the arrest must be based on probable
cause.35 The court then stated, "the information within the
knowledge of the officers at the time they arrived at the Ker's
apartment ... clearly furnished grounds for a reasonable belief
that .. .Ker had committed and was committing the offense
of possession of marijuana." In Draper v. United States 6 the
arrest was based on information supplied by a paid informer
named Hereford, who had provided the federal officers on sev-
eral previous occasions with information which always had
been reliable. Hereford told the officers that Draper would
arrive in Denver on a certain morning train and that he would
be carrying narcotics. Hereford also described in detail Draper's
appearance and the clothes he would be wearing. Draper arrived
as predicted, and the Supreme Court found that the federal nar-
cotics agents had probable cause to believe that he was carrying
narcotics. Justice Douglas dissented, arguing that information
provided by an informer, with nothing more, could not provide
probable cause for an arrest.
In Beck v. Ohio3 the issue was again the admissibility of evi-
dence resulting from a search incidental to an arrest. The court
asserted, "the constitutional validity of the search ... must de-
pend upon the constitutional validity of the arrest. Whether
that arrest was constitutionally valid depends in turn upon
whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officers hud
34. This unannounced entry is the basis for the dissent's argument that the
arrest violated the fourth amendment. Id. at 46.
35. Id. at 34.
36. 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
37. 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
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probable cause to make it.""" The Court held that since the
only information known to the arresting officers, according to
the trial record, was that Beck had a gambling record and that
some information had been given by an unnamed informer,
probable cause for Beck's arrest did not exist. Beck and Draper3o
seem to announce the rule that in order to base probable cause
for an arrest on information supplied by an informer, the record
must at least show that the arresting officers had some obje.
tive basis for believing the informer. In Draper the record
showed that the informer had prove. rel.a e in .h. ,aest and
that the arresting officers had an opportunity to check the
accuracy of some of the information he provided about Draper.
In contrast, the record in Beck showed neither who the informer
was nor what information the officers received.4 0
Since the absence of probable cause at the time an arrest
is perfected will result in the exclusion of evidence obtained as
a result of the arrest, it is obviously important to ascertain the
time at which an arrest occurs.4' A better example of this im-
portance could not be found than Rios v. United States.4 2
In that case, police officers approached a taxicab in which
Rios was riding when the cab stopped at a traffic light. One
of the officers opened the door of the taxicab, and Rios dropped
a package which obviously contained narcotics. However, since
it was not clear from the record whether the door was opened
before the package was dropped or vice versa, the case was re-
manded to the federal district court to determine the exact se-
quence of events. The entire case depended on the exact time
of the arrest, since it was conceded that the officers did not have
probable cause for an arrest at the time they approached the
cab. If they arrested Rios before he dropped the narcotics, the
38. Id. at 91.
39. See text at note 35 .11pra.
40. 379 U.S. at 94. The effect of tlh iil.'ntityv if the infi)rmer on the existence
it probalble cause is illustrated by U nited States v. Pearce, 275 F.2d 318 (Ath
Cir. 1960), in which a search warrant. was issued -ou the hasis of confidential
information, fron a sourc e . . . which has proveil reliahle." The "reliable source"
turned out to he an I'Ml agent who had received tlie inf, rmatin from another
-1-11i agent who had received it froili :11, N%1 if, oiie j\l, had i (er been used before.
It should be noted, however, that tli s case involved pri, table cause for a search
warrant, and the standards may be different for probable cause for arrest and
probable cause for a search. See Comment, 26 l.A. I. 11E\. 802 (l 6).
41. For the usual definitions of arrest, see Comment. 100 U. PA. L. RIv.
1182, 1186 (1952).
42. 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
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narcotics would be inadmissible as evidence since it would be
the result of an unconstitutional arrest. However, if Rios
dropped the package and it was seen by the officers before
they made the arrest, the officers would have had probable
cause for arresting Rios and the arrest would be valid under
the fourth amendment. Since arrests by either state or federal
officers must meet the constitutional standards of the fourth
amendment, it is submitted that a definition of what constitutes
an arrest and the time the arrest occurs are ultimately questions
for the Supreme Court. So far, the Court has avoided the issue
of whether it is possible to hold suspects for questioning with-
out actually making an arrest, and no definite rules have been
formulated to determine exactly when an arrest takes place.
48
Mapp and subsequent Supreme Court decisions should theo-
retically have an immense effect on Louisiana's criminal pro-
cedure, since Louisiana did not recognize the exclusionary rule
prior to Mapp.44 While the problem of the constitutionality of
the arrest had little to do with the conviction of defendants in
criminal prosecutions prior to Mapp, the Louisiana Supreme
Court has found it necessary in recent cases to examine the
facts leading up to an arrest to determine whether or not there
was probable cause for the arrest.45 However, there have been
no cases since Mapp in which the Louisiana Supreme Court has
held either tangible or intangible evidence to be inadmissible
because of the illegality of the defendant's arrest.
The Louisiana Supreme Court held in State v. Aias"4 6 that
there was probable cause for arrest and that a search incidental
to the arrest was therefore constitutional. There a physician
told the police that the defendant "continually bothered him
43. Under the holdings of People v. Rivera, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458, 201 N.E.2d 32
(1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965) and People v. Pugach, 5 N.Y.2d 65,
255 N.Y.S.2d 833, 204 N.E.2d 176 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 936 (1965),
police may, under the. authority of a New York statute, stop and frisk suspicious
people. These detentions do not constitute an arrest, and if the frisking leads
the police reasonably to believe that the person has committed or is committing
a crime, they may then arrest them and, incidental to the arrest, thoroughly search
the suspects. See Comment, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 848 (1965), in which it is sug-
gested that the United States Supreme Court will eventually develop rules govern-
ing the power of the police to detain and frisk suspicious persons.
44. State v. Calascione, 243 La. 993, 994, 149 So. 2d 417, 418 (1963).
45. Slate v. Mcllvaine, 247 La. 747, 174 So. 2d 515 (1965); State v. Mar-
chetti, 247 La. 649, 173 So. 2d 531 (1965) ; State v. Pickens, 245 La. 680, 160
So. 2d 577 (1965) ; State v. Aias, 243 La. 946, 149 So. 2d 400 (1963) ; State v.
Calascione, 243 La. 993, 149 So. 2d 417 (1963) ; State v. Cade, 244 La. 534,
153 So.2d 382 (1963).
46. 243 La. 946, 149 So. 2d 400 (1963).
1966]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
for paregoric prescriptions. ' 47 The officers then went to defend-
ant's house where, after they entered onto defendant's property
but before they opened the door to his house, they smelled "an
odor of paregoric and assumed that it was being cooked or had
just been cooked."148 One of the officers forced open the rear
door, arrested the defendant and discovered incriminating evi-
dence in the kitchen. Assuming that none of the defendant's
fourth amendment rights were violated until the officers forced
open the door of the house, it is submitted that there may be
conflict on the probable cause issue between State v. Aias and
Johnson v. United States,49 where the Supreme Court refused to
base a finding of probable cause on what the officers believed
to be the smell of burning opium.50
In State v. Marchetti,5 1 the Louisiana Sapreme Court again
found probable cause for arrest on facts which, it is believed,
might not be held a sufficient basis for probable cause by the
Supreme Court. 52 Marchetti was arrested because two police-
men had been told to be "on the lookout" for a 1960 Pontiac
with an Illinois license. The owner of the car, Leonard Flana-
gan, "was being sought in connection with an investigation being
conducted through a prior arrest of said Flanagan." The offi-
cers found the parked car, and about fifteen minutes later Mar-
chetti, whom the officers assumed to be Flanagan, approached
the car, removed something from the trunk of the car, and put
it in his coat pocket. When questioned, Marchetti identified
himself and said that he had been paid to remove some clothes
from a hotel room and place them in an automobile. Marchetti's
story "sounded phony" to the officers, so they took him to the
police station for questioning and booked him for vagrancy and
investigation of armed robbery. About an hour after he was
booked, Marchetti confessed that he had committed a robbery.
The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that "the arresting offi-
cers had probable cause for arresting Marchetti." Although it
47. Id. at 948, 149 So. 2d at 401.
48. ]bid.
49. 333 U.S. 10 (1948). Detectives recognized the smell of burning opium
emerging from a hotel room. They entered, arrested the occupant, and searched
the room. The United States Supreme Court held that the search could not be
considered incidental to a lawful arrest, since there was not probable cause for
the arrest. See also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
50. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1962-1963 Term--
Criminal Procedure, 24 LA. L. REV. 168, 341 (1964).
51. 247 La. 649, 173 So. 2d 531 (1965).
52. Compare this case with Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
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is difficult to pinpoint the exact time at which Marchetti's arrest
occurred, there can be no doubt that he had definitely been
placed under arrest when the officers took him to the police
station. 53 It is submitted that the officers did not have sufficient
information connecting Marchetti with a robbery at that time
to constitute probable cause for an arrest for robbery. How-
ever, since Marchetti was booked for vagrancy, it could be ar-
gued that there was probable cause for arresting him for violat-
ing the vagrancy statute, assuming that the statute is consti-
tutional. 54
In State v. Pickens55 the Louisiana Supreme Court found that
there was probable cause for an arrest because police officers
who were investigating a burglary which had already been com-
mitted saw the defendants, who were "not local boys," driving
at a slow speed in an alley behind the burglarized store. When
Pickens is compared with decisions of the Supreme Court 6 con-
cerning the quantum of information needed to establish prob-
able cause for arrest, it can be inferred that the test of probable
cause applied in Louisiana is less severe than that applied in
the federal courts.
It is submitted that decisions of the United States Supreme
Court concerning arrest will have an increasingly important ef-
fect on the admissibility in Louisiana courts of evidence obtained
as the result of an arrest. Until recently, most Supreme Court
cases under the fourth amendment have dealt with the consti-
tutionality of searches. It is believed, however, that Wong Sun
and subsequent cases portend an increasing emphasis on the con-
stitutionality of arrests- and the inadmissibility of evidence re-
sulting from an unconstitutional arrest. As the constitutional
standard is clarified, there will be less room for state courts to
apply a standard less strict than that of the federal courts. At
present the "prudent man" test for probable cause allows a dif-
ference of opinion as to what constitutes sufficient information
to ground a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed
and that the suspect committed it. This discretion will probably
53. LA. R.S. 15:58 (1950) provides: "[A]rrest is the taking of one person
into custody by another." The definition is the same in the proposed revision of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, title V, Arrest.
54. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1964-1965 Term-
Criminal Procedure, 26 LA. L. REV. 599 (1966).
55. 245 La. 680, 160 So. 2d 577 (1964).
56. E.g., note 30 supra.
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be removed, however, by future Supreme Court decisions which
define the requirements of the fourth amendment more clearly,
and the gap between the federal and the Louisiana standards
will narrow considerably.
A. L. Wright II
CAUSE TO SEARCH AND SEIZE
Crime investigators often face the problem of whether to
search the property or person of a suspect. If a search is im-
proper for want of sufficient cause, then all that it uncovers
must be excluded from any subsequent prosecution. Thus a police
blunder may not only render a fruitful search futile, but may
also cloak the criminal with immunity. Unfortunately, it is im-
possible to arm the police with a criterion which will unfailingly
answer the question: "Are the facts sufficient to support a
search or seizure?" This Comment is an attempt to analyze the
factors which the courts have weighed in evaluating police re-
sponses to this question.
I. THE FEDERAL CASES
The federal powers of search and seizure are limited by the
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution.' Analyti-
cally, this amendment is severable into two clauses. The first
requires that all searches and seizures be reasonable and the
second prohibits the issuance of search warrants without a show-
ing of probable cause. The test of reasonableness set forth in
the first clause is two-fold: (1) there must be reasonable
grounds 2 to justify the intrusion and (2) the search or seizure
must be executed in a reasonable manner.3 Where the search or
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and Particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
2. The reasonable cause test, implicit in the first clause of the fourth
amendment, must be distinguished from the "reasonable grounds" and "reason-
able cause" language frequently used in legislation creating police arrest powers.
Such language is equivalent to the fourth amendment's requirement that arrests
may be made only upon probable cause. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 478 n.6 (1963); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959).
3. Reasonableness of execution includes such considerations as the intensity,
object, area, duration, and violence of the search. See Harris v. United States,
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